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AGENDA BUILDING AND SETTING 
hVESTIGATING THE FLOW 
OF ARGUMENTS AMONG CAMPAIGNERS, 
THE MEDIA, AND THE PUBLIC 
IN A REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN: 
By Werner Wirth, Jorg Matthes, Christian Schemer, Martin 
Wettstein, Thomas Friemel, Regula Hanggli, and Gabriele Siegert 
This s tudy  tests second-level agenda-building and -setting eflects in the 
course of a referendum campaign. Personal standardized interviews wi th  
forty-seven different campaign managers and a content analysis of cam- 
paign material are linked to a content analysis of T V a n d  newspaper cov- 
erage and a three-wave public opinion survey. The results demonstrate 
the dynamic flow of arguments  in the agenda-building and -setting 
process: top-down from the campaigners to the news media and the pub- 
lic. 
For both agenda setting and agenda building, mass communica- 
tion scholars have accumulated convincing evidence over the years, cov- 
ering numerous issues in many countries, for all types of news media, 
for local elections and national elections, and also during more quiescent 
political times.’ In addition to this impressive corpus of research, there 
are some gaps waiting for scholarly attention. To begin with, there are 
few studies exploring how agenda building and agenda setting work 
together during a single campaign or election.* Put differently, while we 
know that agenda setting and agenda building work, we lack a holistic 
picture of how the policy agenda finds its way to the media agenda, and, 
finally, to the public agenda. 
Second, classic agenda-setting and agenda-building research has 
examined candidate salience in election campaigns or issue salience in 
local, national, and international settings. However, we have a rather 
limited knowledge about these processes for referendum campaigns. 
Third, there are hardly any studies using standardized interviews with 
campaigners to measure candidate agendas. Fourth, and last, agenda- 
setting research is dominated by cross-sectional studies. These designs 
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have provided rich insights, with real-world data, and have gathered 
convincing evidence for both agenda setting and agenda building. 
However, cross-sectional studies cannot portray the dynamics of a cam- 
paign over time. To address these four research gaps, this paper reports 
a study on a referendum campaign in Switzerland. 
First- and Second-level Agenda Setting. Research over the past 
thirty-five years has supported the transferral of media issue salience to Review 
public salience. This process, however, is not universal, as a plethora of 
limiting and contributing variables qualify the e f f e~ t .~  Among these, 
media reliance is central to predicting agenda-setting proce~ses.~ Media 
reliance is the extent to which a certain medium is important to informa- 
tion acquisition. As Tsfati has put it, "[ilf audiences are active and critical 
toward news [. . .] they may resist the agenda offered by the media."5 In 
fact, some studies have shown smaller or non-significant effects when 
media reliance is low.6 
Instead of examining an agenda of issues, second-level agenda 
setting investigates an agenda of attributes, that is, the way in which 
an issue is contextualized or framed.' These attributes can be sub-issues 
or specific aspects of issues, such as issue arguments (cognitive attrib- 
utes). Furthermore, the second level of agenda setting also incorporates 
specific evaluations or journalistic assessments of issues (affective attrib- 
utes)! 
Several studies have supported this theorizing. McCombs and oth- 
ers found a positive correlation between the media agenda and the voter 
agenda for cognitive and affective object attributes? Golan and Wanta 
documented second-level effects in an analysis of the 2000 presidential 
primary in New Hampshire.Io Kim, Scheufele, and Shanahan found sim- 
ilar effects for a local issue." 
More recent studies reported first- and second-level agenda-setting 
effects of political ads on public opinion,I2 affective second-level effects 
of nonverbal visual information about  candidate^,'^ and various agenda- 
setting effects for young ~0ters . I~  n addition to those field studies, there 
is also experimental evidence for the transferral of attribute sa1ien~e.I~ 
First- and Second-level Agenda Building. Apart from the transfer- 
ral of issue or object salience to the public, scholars have studied influ- 
ences on news media agendas, a type of research that Lang and Lang 
called agenda building.Ib Gandy was one of the first to suggest going 
"beyond agenda setting to determine who sets the media agenda, how 
and for what purpose it is set, and with what impact on the distribution 
of power and values in ~ociety.'"~ Weaver, McCombs, and Shaw identify 
three major sources that exert an influence on the media agenda: (a) 
influential news sources, such as the president or political elites; (b) other 
elite media sources (intermedia agenda setting); and (c) social norms and 
traditions of journalism.1M 
Traditionally, studies investigating the agenda-building process of 
political elites have relied on news releases. For instance, Turk showed 
that state government news releases can increase the public salience of 
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state agencies in subsequent media ~0verage.I~ n a study of a political 
campaign, Kaid demonstrated that newspapers incorporated candidate 
news releases exactly as they were disseminated.20 Wanta et al. found 
that the agenda of issues presented by several presidents in the State of 
the Union address influenced the subsequent national press agenda.2l 
Beyond first-level agenda building, other studies have investigated how 
issue attributes put forth by elites have found their way into media cov- 
erage (second-level agenda building). Huckins, for instance, investigat- 
ed the building of the media agenda by an influential interest group that 
succeeded in setting the media agenda between 1992 and 1994.22 More 
recent studies found additional evidence for online intermedia agenda 
setting,23 effects of media coverage on the candidate agenda,24 and 
effects of the public agenda on the media agenda.25 
Taken together, there is convincing evidence for agenda setting 
and agenda building, both at the issue and at the attribute levels. 
However, fewer studies have tracked the full flow of issue or attribute 
salience from political elites to the news media and then to the public. 
Exceptions are: first, a study by Kiousis et al. that investigated the build- 
ing of the print media agenda by candidates in the 2002 Florida guber- 
natorial election, and the setting of the public agenda by the media;z6 
second, a study by Kiousis, Popescu, and Mitrook that investigated the 
same linkages among press releases of twenty-eight US. companies, 
media coverage of the key issues, and public opinion in 2005;27 and 
third, Tan and Weaver’s longitudinal study of agendas of the media, 
Congress, and the public. 
Argument Agenda Setting in Referendum Campaigns. There is a 
large body of literature investigating (second-level) agenda-building 
and agenda-setting effects. However, little is known about how these 
processes work for referendum campaigns. The study of campaign 
effects has focused predominantly on elections. Moreover, most of the 
research has been conducted in the United States. 
But why do referendum campaigns matter in the study of agenda 
setting and building, and why are they special? In referendum cam- 
paigns, several parties, NGOs, and other organizations form strategic 
camps, with, in most instances, one ”camp” opposing the referendum 
and one camp supporting it. The camps are usually created by forming 
naturally predictable, pragmatic, or even “strange” strategic alliances. 
Thus, political parties are not the only actors involved in a campaign. In 
some campaigns, parties make up only a minority of involved actors, as 
citizens’ interest groups, churches, or NGOs can play a decisive role. 
This makes referendums less predictable than regular elections. As de 
Vreese states, ”while longer-term factors such as partisanship or ideolo- 
gy have been found to be important in national elections, the short-term 
impact of campaign strategies and tactics can make a substantial differ- 
ence in determining referendum outcomes.”28 More important, and con- 
trary to regular democratic elections, no specific candidates appear 
exclusively in the debate, simply because no candidates are voted for. 
Thus, voters cannot take candidate cues, such as candidate images, as 
heuristics for their j~dgment.’~ The crucial difference, therefore, is that 
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the campaign debate is centered on specific arguments, in favor of or 
opposing the referendum. Each camp tries to promote its arguments in 
the debate, and the camp with the most salient and thus most compelling 
arguments wins the referendum. 
In agenda-setting terminology, those arguments can be interpreted 
as cognitive issue a t t r i b~ te s .~~  Argument salience in a referendum debate 
can thus be regarded as second-level agenda setting?’ Basically, each 
camp tries to establish its arguments in media coverage. The higher the 
correlation between the arguments of one camp and the corresponding 
arguments in the media coverage, the higher the second-level agenda- 
building function of that camp. Likewise, the higher the correspondence 
between the arguments in the media and the public salience of those 
arguments, the higher the second-level agenda-setting effect. 
It is important to note that the arguments are conveyed by the 
media; typically, direct camp communication of arguments to the public 
is limited. Following this line of reasoning, it is clear that media reliance 
becomes a crucial variable in the agenda-setting process. When citizens 
do not rely on the media, agenda-setting effects are unlikely to occur. 
Thus, we can assume that media reliance is a crucial moderator for (sec- 
ond-level) agenda-setting effects. 
In a September 2006 national referendum, Swiss citizens accepted a Study 
new asylum law suggesting harsher measures to prevent abuses by asy- Context 
lum seekers and to avoid social tension (68% voted in favor). The refer- and 
endum was launched by the left, which tried to fight a tightening of the Hypotheses 
asylum law that a center-right coalition had established in the parlia- 
ment. The main battle line was between two camps, one favoring the law 
(i.e., pro-tightening asylum policy), and one against the new asylum law 
(i.e., against tightening of asylum policy). The camps included not only 
political parties, but also a large number of other mobilized organiza- 
tions, e.g., organizations that support refugees and foreigners, religious 
organizations, business interest associations, and some domain-specific 
organizations defending the Swiss national tradition.32 
Taken together, forty-seven different organizations were mobilized 
in this referendum, thirty-two in the camp opposing a tightening of the 
asylum law (contra camp), and fifteen in the camp that favored a tight- 
ening (pro camp).33 All those organizations actively joined the debate, 
launching a campaign trying to establish their arguments in the media 
and to the public. This constellation demonstrates how referendum cam- 
paigns are multifaceted and unique. How agenda setting works in a ref- 
erendum campaign is, therefore, a hitherto unresolved and very pressing 
research question. 
In order to answer this question, we have, first, measured the agen- 
da of all forty-seven campaign organizations involved in the campaign. 
More specifically, we used two operationalizations: standardized inter- 
views with the campaign manager of each organization and a content 
analysis of campaign material (e.g., press releases). Second, we conduct- 
ed an extensive content analysis of relevant media coverage of the cam- 
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paign. Third, we gathered public opinion data in a three-wave panel 
study. 
With these data, the major aim of this paper is to analyze the flow 
of arguments from both camps to media coverage, and from media cov- 
erage to the public. Based on previous research in agenda building, we 
assume there is a significant correlation of campaign arguments with 
salient arguments in the media. As one of the first studies in this area, 
we use two operationalizations of the campaigners’ agenda: campaign 
manager interviews and content analysis of campaign material. Thus, 
H1: The salience of arguments in interviews with key 
campaigners (Hla) and the salience of arguments in cam- 
paign material (Hlb) will be positively related to the 
salience of arguments in media coverage. 
There are no theoretical grounds driving hypotheses about which 
camp is more successful in distributing its agenda. Thus, 
RQ1: How do the pro camp and the contra camp differ 
in shaping the media agenda of campaign arguments? 
The second hypothesis concerns second-level agenda setting. 
Salient arguments in the media should also be salient arguments for the 
public. However, based on previous research, it can be expected that this 
relationship holds true only when the public relies on the mass media. 
When there is no media reliance, media salience and public salience are 
thought to be weakly related. This leads us to the following hypothesis. 
H2: There will be a stronger correlation between 
salience of arguments in media coverage and public argu- 
ment salience for citizens with high media reliance com- 
pared to citizens with low media reliance. 
Methods At the heart of our analysis, we have chosen the seven key argu- 
ments of the debate (see Table 1). Those key arguments were selected 
through examination of news releases and previous parliamentary 
debates. Asylum policy is not a new issue, so selecting the key argu- 
ments from past debates and previous material was deemed appropri- 
ate. In order to measure the salience of those arguments, all measures 
were applied exactly the same way in all data sources. 
Interviews wi th  Elite Campaigners. The relevant campaign organ- 
izations were identified based on parliamentary debates, voting recom- 
mendations, previous media coverage, and campaigners’ Web sites. By 
doing so, forty-seven relevant political parties and organizations were 
identified. For each organization, we conducted a standardized inter- 
view with the campaign manager. All campaign managers agreed to 
participate, which is not unusual in small countries such as Switzerland. 
Personal interviews were conducted (and recorded on tape) by two 
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trained scholars, before the June 2006 referendum vote. The average 
duration of an interview was sixty minutes. Thirty-two organizations 
belong in the contra camp and fifteen in the pro camp. This difference in 
camp size is due to the fact that the contra organizations came from more 
diverse  background^.^^ 
As the central variable, argument salience was measured by asking 
how important each of the seven arguments (see Table 1) was for the 
respective organization (1 = very unimportant to 5 = very important). 
Each argument was presented to the campaigners in exactly the same 
wording as presented in the public opinion survey and measured in con- 
tent analysis. 
Campaign Materials. We analyzed all campaign materials put 
forth by all involved organizations throughout the campaign from early 
June 2006 to the end of September 2006. Campaign materials were press 
releases, speeches from media conferences, and public statements by the 
organizations. Materials were collected by asking the campaigners for all 
official and non-official documents. As all campaigners agreed to do so, 
we have a full population of all materials. A total of N = 264 documents 
was gathered including seventy-two press releases, thirty-three public 
statements, sixty internal campaign strategy documents that were sent 
by the organizations, twenty-two flyers and leaflets, and seventy-seven 
other campaign documents. These strategic documents were distributed 
and available throughout the campaign. Thus, and in contrast to the 
analysis of media content, no time periods were defined. The sample was 
divided into materials from the pro camp (n  = 68) and the contra camp 
( n  = 196). The salience of all seven campaign arguments was measured 
by coding whether or not an argument was present in these materials (a 
dichotomous measure). Coding was done together with the media con- 
tent, as detailed below. 
Media Content. The content analysis (N = 3,314) started in early 
June 2006 and ended with the last CATI-interview of the third panel 
wave at the end of September 2006. The unit of analysis was the argu- 
ment. Five TV formats of both German- and French-speaking television 
in Switzerland were sampled, including prime-time news formats. All 
news items were sampled that dealt with the asylum law in particular or 
asylum policy in general. The sample of print media included both elite 
and non-elite media sources of the German and the French parts of 
Swit~erland.3~ 
In order to measure argument salience, whether an argument was 
present or not in news coverage was coded (a dichotomous measure). We 
did not code how important this argument was within a news item. The 
reasoning is that the more an argument is present in news coverage, the 
higher is its salience in the news media. Coding of media content and 
campaign materials was performed by four trained graduate students 
fluent in both languages. As a reliability check revealed, average agree- 
ment for all coders was suff i~ient .~~ 
The sample was divided into three periods: the first ranged from 
the beginning of the content analysis to the first wave of the panel sur- 
vey; the second was from the first to second wave of the survey; and the 
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third ranged from the second wave of the survey to the last interview of 
the third panel wave. An indicator of argument salience was construed for 
all three periods: the total number of a particular argument’s mentions in 
each period in relation to the number of all arguments of that period. The 
more often an argument was mentioned, the higher its salience. 
Panel Survey. The three-wave panel survey was conducted by 
means of RDD computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). A global 
polling company programmed the questionnaire, pretested the study, 
and performed all interviews of a representative national survey for the 
German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland. The first wave cov- 
ered 1,725 interviews in July 2006 (52.2% female, age M = 48.51, sd = 
17.11). The second wave took place in August 2006 with 1,415 persons 
participating again. The third wave took place shortly after the referen- 
dum with 1,049 persons participating again. 
For each argument, argument awareness, as a basic measure of 
salience, was assessed by the question: ”Have you ever heard the follow- 
ing argument?” (1= yes, 0 = no). The arguments were applied in exact- 
ly the same way in all data sources. To measure media reliance, partici- 
pants were asked: “How important is the following media source for 
you in order to get informed about politics such as the asylum law?” (1 
= very unimportant to 5 = very important). This question was asked 
with respect to TV and newspaper. The answers were summed up to 
form an overall index of media reliance (Cronbachs alpha = 0.726). 
The idea underlying this index was that people who regard news media 
as very important have generally high media reliance.37 The sample 
was split in two groups by means of a median split. As a control, politi- 
cal orientation was measured on a 10-point scale by asking individuals 
to place themselves on the scale from left-wing to right-wing (1 = left, 10 
= right). 
Data Analysis. We have four data sets, and for all four data sets, 
we have measured the same seven arguments. Combining those data 
sets requires using a statistical technique that can be applied to all data 
sets at the same time. As common in many agenda-setting studies, we 
have chosen rank-order correlations (Spearman’s rho) as the chief statis- 
tical test. This technique is the only one that allows a combination of all 
data sets. The logic is intuitive: The seven arguments were ranked 
according to their salience in all four data sets. For the interviews with 
campaign organizations and for the content analysis of their campaign 
output, a rank order of all seven arguments was calculated for the pro 
and the contra camp respectively (i.e., both camps rated all arguments). 
For the content analysis of news media, a rank order of arguments was 
calculated for all three phases. Likewise, we calculated a rank order for 
every panel wave, and for respondents with high and low media 
reliance. 
Results Hypotheses Tests. We hypothesized a significant correlation 
between the arguments in the campaign interviews (Hla), campaign 
materials (Hlb), and argument salience in the media. The order of argu- 
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TABLE 1 
Rank Order of Arguments for All Agendas 
Argument Argument Argument Argument 
Campaign Campaign Media Public 
Salience Salience Salience Salience 
(Interviews) (Content Analysis (Content Analysis (Panel Survey) 
of Campaign of News Media) 
Materials) 
Argu- Pro Con Pro Con W, W1.* w2.3 Wl W2 W, 
ments 
A, 1 4 1 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 
A2 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 4 4 2 
A3 2 5 3 6 2 2 3 5 5 5 
A4 4 6 6 7 4 4 4 3 3 3 
A5 5 2 4 1 5 5 5.5' 6 6 6 
6.5' 7 5 4 6 6 5.5l 1 2 4 
A7 6.5' 3 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Note: W = Panel Wave, A, = The abuse of asylum policy must be stopped, A, = The humanitarian 
tradition of Switzerland must be maintained, A, = The execution of asylum politics must be more 
efficient, A,= Switzerland is too attractive for asylum seekers, A, =The rights of asylum seekers have 
to be protected, A, = There are already too many foreigners in Switzerland, A, = Foreign people con- 
tribute to the social and cultural quality of Switzerland;' if two arguments had the same salience 
value, they were not ordered but given the mid-rank. 
Values with the same magnitude are said to be tied. Taking the mid-rank is generally recommend- 
ed in the statistical literature; see Jean Dickinson Gibbons and Subhabrata Chakraborti, Non-parame- 
tric Statistical Inference (New York: CRC Press, 2003), 194-95. 
ments for all involved actors is depicted in Table 1. Table 2 shows the 
rank-order correlations (interviews and campaign materials) for the pro 
camp, the contra camp, and for all three time periods. As can be seen, 
there is no significant correlation between the salient arguments of the 
contra camp and argument salience in the media, nor for the interview 
data nor for the campaign material data. In other words, the contra camp 
did not succeed in establishing its arguments in news coverage. In con- 
trast, we can find a significant correlation between the pro camp argu- 
ments and the salience of those arguments in the media, both for the 
interview and the campaign material data. This relationship is signifi- 
cant for all three waves. Answering RQ1, we can generally demonstrate 
a second-level agenda-building effect for the pro camp; however, the 
voices of the contra camp remained largely unheard. Thus, Hla and Hlb 
can be confirmed only for the pro camp. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlations between Campaign Argument Salience (Interviews and Campaign Material) 
and Media Argument Salience 
Argument Media Argument Media Argument Media 
Salience Wave 1 Salience Wave 2 Salience Wave 3 
Interview Argument Salience .85** .79* .85** 
Pro Camp 
Interview Argument Salience .29 
Contra Camp 
.11 .23 
Campaign Material Argument .78* 
Salience Pro Camp 
Campaign Material Argument 
Salience Contra Camp 
.20 
.75* .84** 
.09 .24 
Note: * p i .01; ** p < ,001. 
In our second hypothesis, we expected a significant relationship 
between argument salience in the media and public argument salience, 
especially for individuals with high media reliance. Confirming our 
assumption, there is no significant correlation between the two agendas 
for people who have reported low media reliance. Put differently, the 
salient arguments of low-reliance individuals did not correspond to the 
salient arguments in the media throughout the whole campaign. As 
Table 3 reveals, there is a significant correlation between media salience 
and public salience for high-reliance individuals. However, this relation- 
ship does evolve in the course of the campaign. There is a steady rise in 
correlations from wave one to wave three; only at wave three, however, 
do these correlations reach statistical significance. Obviously, the cumu- 
lated exposure to media content in the course of the whole campaign led 
to this significant second-level agenda-setting effect. To interpret this 
finding, keep in mind that we have measured the extent to which audi- 
ence members have heard of an argument. In wave one, only a small 
part of the public had heard those arguments, and, therefore, the corre- 
lation between media salience and public salience is rather low. By the 
time of wave three, however, repeated exposure to salient arguments in 
mass media reporting ensured a high salience of the arguments on the 
public agenda. 
Additional Analyses. We looked at the stability of public salience. 
For individuals with high media reliance, the stability of argument 
salience from wave one to wave three is rather low and not significant 
(rho = .51, n.s.). However, there is a high stability of argument salience 
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TABLE 3 
Correlations between Media Argument Salience and Public Argument Salience for Individuals 
with High and Low Media Reliance 
High Media Reliance Low Media Reliance 
Argument Argument Argument Argument Argument Argument 
Public Public Public Public Public Public 
Salience Salience Salience Salience Salience Salience 
Wave 1 Wave2 Wave 3 Wave 1 Wave2 Wave3 
Argument Media .07 .25 .79* -.21 .07 .oo 
Salience Wave 1 
Argument Media .21 .32 .82** -.31 .oo -.14 
Salience Wave 2 
Argument Media .29 .47 .92** -.16 .18 .07 
Salience Wave 3 
Note: * p < .01; ** p < ,001. 
from wave one to wave three for respondents with low media reliance 
(rho = 39, p < .001). In other words, people with high media reliance 
were more volatile compared to people with low media reliance. 
In order to understand the full flow of arguments, we have also 
examined the relationship between argument salience for the pro and 
the contra camp and public argument salience (see Table 4). For in- 
terview and campaign material data sets, there is no correspondence 
between argument salience of both campaign camps and public sali- 
ence for citizens with low media reliance.38 Obviously, individuals with 
low media reliance were not interested in the asylum law, so their agen- 
da did not correspond to the media and the campaigners' agenda. 
However, for the pro camp, we can find a significant correlation for indi- 
viduals with high media reliance: There is a rise in correlations from 
wave one to wave three. This means that, at wave three, the argument 
agenda of the pro camp significantly corresponds to public salience of 
arguments. Of course, this does not mean that there is a direct effect from 
the campaign to the public. In contrast, this result illustrates that the 
arguments put forth by the pro camp were successfully implemented in 
media coverage, and finally reached the public. Consequently, the pro 
camp succeeded with the fundamental goal of every campaigner: to steer 
media attention and to impose a dominant argumentation on the audi- 
ence. 
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TABLE 4 
Correlations between Campaign Camp Argument Salience and Public Argument Salience 
for Individuals with High and Low Media Reliance 
High Media Reliance Low Media Reliance 
~ 
Argument Argument Argument Argument Argument Argument 
Public Public Public Public Public Public 
Salience Salience Salience Salience Salience Salience 
Wave1 Wave2 Wave 3 Wave 1 Wave2 Wave3 
Interview .11 .40 .83** .02 .29 .27 
Argument Salience 
Pro Camp 
Interview -.50 
Argument Salience 
Contra Camp 
.-.36 .oo .64 .64 .64 
Campaign Material .32 .39 .75* .14 .43 .46 
Argument Salience 
Pro Camp 
Campaign Material .04 
Argument Salience 
Contra Camp 
.05 .09 .40 .45 .64 
Note: ** p < ,001. 
Still the question remains: Why did the contra camp not succeed 
in imposing its agenda of arguments? It seems reasonable to assume that 
the contra camp did, at least, reach its own partisans. Therefore, we have 
divided the survey sample into the political left (which is expected to be 
contra) and the political right (which is expected to be pro) by our poli- 
tical orientation measure. Interestingly, there is no correspondence 
between the arguments of the contra camp (interview data) and the 
arguments of political left respondents (wave three, rho = -.07, n.s.). Less 
surprising, there is also no correlation between contra camp argument 
salience and right wing respondents (rho = 2 5 ,  n.s.). In contrast, there is 
a correlation between argument salience of the pro camp and right wing 
respondents (rho = .70, p -= .05), and, again, no significant correlation 
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between pro camp argument salience and left-wing respondents (rho = 
.38, n.s.). The campaign material data yield similar results. This means 
that, while the pro camp has reached its own partisans, the contra camp 
failed to bring out its argument agenda to its own disciples. 
As a factual matter, referendum campaigns are about arguments. 
The flow of arguments from political elites to the media and to the pub- 
lic will be decisive for the campaign outcome. This study tested the 
impact of second-level agenda setting and building in a referendum cam- 
paign. It was shown that the proponents of the asylum law did succeed 
in bringing their argumentation into news coverage, which, in turn, 
increased public salience for their agenda. The results also show that the 
mass media have no direct or uniform effect on all audience members. In 
fact, only those individuals who relied heavily on the mass media for 
political information were influenced by salient media arguments. 
Individuals with low media reliance have in effect kept their "eyes and 
ears shut," and, therefore, the campaign yielded no effects whatsoever 
for this group. 
In practical terms, we have learned that the contra camp failed to 
communicate its agenda, as the media simply did not adopt it. In order 
to interpret this, we have to take into account the general political climate 
of Switzerland. Based on past referendums about asylum policy, the out- 
come of the referendum was rather predictable, a fact also acknowledged 
by both camps in our interviews. The pro camp generally expected to 
win, and told us so. For the contra camp, in contrast, some campaign 
planners admitted that they saw a minimal chance to win the vote. 
Nevertheless, they were heading the fight for reasons of public reputa- 
tion, credibility, and fundamental values.3y Keeping this in mind, we can 
speculate that the media favored the arguments of the winning side. It is 
also noteworthy that the contra camp did not even reach its own left- 
wing followers in the broad public. 
Another aspect revealed in the interviews helps to explain our 
findings. In contrast to the opponents of a tighter asylum law, the stra- 
tegy of the proponents was more efficient: They denied central argu- 
ments of their adversaries less often than did the opponents. For 
instance, the most important argument of the contra camp was the third 
most important argument for the pro camp. This argument of humani- 
tarian tradition-arguably one of the key arguments against a tightening 
of asylum policy-was still used by the pro camp. In other words, the 
pro camp supported a tightening of the asylum law and at the same time, 
they also claimed that the humanitarian tradition of the country must be 
maintained. Thus, the pro camp reframed this argument in a way that cit- 
izens would not clearly recognize it as a contra argument. This gave the 
contra camp a much more powerful arsenal of  argument^.^^ 
Beyond the specific context of the asylum law campaign, our study 
is unique in several aspects. First, we have conducted interviews with all 
relevant campaigners. These data were validated by a content analysis of 
all relevant campaign materials. 
Discussion 
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Further, we jointly observed agenda building and agenda setting 
in a single study. Thus, we were able to track the dynamic success of the 
campaign over time. By conducting a panel survey, we could observe an 
increase in correlations among the agendas over a period of several 
months. This result supports the idea that real-world agenda-building 
and -setting effects have to be understood as cumulative, long-term 
Notwithstanding the rich and methodologically demanding data, 
there are some drawbacks of the present study. To begin with, we have 
used rank-order correlations as the statistical procedure to observe 
agenda-building and -setting effects. Although this is the only way to 
jointly analyze these rich sets of data, more advanced data analytical 
techniques could be used, for example, if we looked at the combination 
of survey data and content analysis. We also have to be cautious in inter- 
preting causal relationships. Although we find correlations between all 
sets of data, the time ordering for combined analysis of the campaign- 
ers' data and the media content is less clear than for media content and 
public opinion data. Furthermore, we have relied on tests of statistical 
significance, although we do not have random sampling in all data sets. 
Relying on absolute size of correlations for interpreting findings would 
seem somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, and for reasons of consistency, we 
have used significance 
Second, we have actually measured awareness of campaign argu- 
ments for the public opinion data. Although similar indicators have 
been successfully used in previous the perceived importance 
of those arguments would have been a more valid indicator. Third, 
there were more contra campaigners than pro campaigners, and, thus, 
the measurement for the contra camp agenda might be more accurate 
than for the pro camp agenda. However, we have sampled all organiza- 
tions involved in the campaign, so there was no reason to select some 
organizations over others. 
Despite these limitations, we believe that such large-scale real- 
world studies have merit. Of course, a gain in external validity comes at 
a cost of internal validity. However, such data allow insights into the 
intertwined relationship between mass communication and society that 
are hard to accomplish otherwise. Therefore, a fruitful cross-fertilization 
would result from joining large-scale multi-method studies like the 
present one with smaller studies that can establish a causal link between 
agendas. 
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